Local-Encoding-Preserving Secure Network Coding---Part I: Fixed Security
  Level by Guang, Xuan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
02
38
8v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  6
 N
ov
 20
18
1
Local-Encoding-Preserving Secure Network
Coding—Part I: Fixed Security Level
Xuan Guang, Member, IEEE, Raymond W. Yeung, Fellow, IEEE,
and Fang-Wei Fu, Member, IEEE
Abstract
Information-theoretic security is considered in the paradigm of network coding in the presence of
wiretappers, who can access one arbitrary edge subset up to a certain size, also referred to as the
security level. Secure network coding is applied to prevent the leakage of the source information to
the wiretappers. In this two-part paper, we consider the problem of secure network coding when the
information rate and the security level can change over time. In the current paper (i.e., Part I of the
two-part paper), we focus on the problem for a fixed security level and a flexible rate. To efficiently
solve this problem, we put forward local-encoding-preserving secure network coding, where a family of
secure linear network codes (SLNCs) is called local-encoding-preserving if all the SLNCs in this family
share a common local encoding kernel at each intermediate node in the network. We present an efficient
approach for constructing upon an SLNC that exists a local-encoding-preserving SLNC with the same
security level and the rate reduced by one. By applying this approach repeatedly, we can obtain a family
of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with a fixed security level and multiple rates. We also develop a
polynomial-time algorithm for efficient implementation of this approach. Furthermore, it is proved that
the proposed approach incurs no penalty on the required field size for the existence of SLNCs in terms
of the best known lower bound by Guang and Yeung. The result in this paper will be used as a building
block for efficiently constructing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for all possible pairs of
rate and security level, which will be discussed in the companion paper (i.e., Part II of the two-part
paper) [36].
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1949, Shannon in his celebrated paper [1] put forward the well-known Shannon cipher system. In
this system, a sender wishes to transmit a private message to a receiver via a “public” channel which
is eavesdropped by a wiretapper, and it is required that this wiretapper cannot obtain any information
about the message. For this purpose, the sender applies a random key to encrypt the message and then
transmit this encrypted message via the “public” channel. The random key is shared with the receiver via
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2a “secure” channel that is inaccessible by the wiretapper. The receiver can recover the private message
from the encrypted message and the random key, while the wiretapper cannot obtain any information
about the private message. This is referred to as information-theoretic security in the literature.
In 1979, Blakley [2] and Shamir [3] independently put forward another well-known cipher system
with information-theoretic security, called secret sharing, which subsumes the Shannon cipher system.
In this system, a secret is encoded into shares which are distributed among a set of participants, and it
is required that only the qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret, while no information at
all about the secret can be obtained from the shares of any unqualified set of participants.
Another related model called wiretap channel II was proposed by Ozarow and Wyner [4], in which
the sender is required to transmit the message to the receiver through a set of noiseless point-to-point
channels without leaking any information about the message to a wiretapper who can fully access any
one but not more than one subset of the channels up to a certain size. Logically, wiretap channel II is a
special case of secret sharing.
In 2000, Ahlswede et al. [5] formally put forward the concept of network coding that allows the
intermediate nodes in a noiseless network to process the received information. They proved that if coding
is applied at the nodes, rather than routing only, the source node can multicast messages to each sink
node at the theoretically maximum rate, i.e., the smallest minimum cut capacity between the source
node and the sink nodes, as the alphabet size of both the information source symbol and the channel
transmission symbol tends to infinity. Subsequently, Li et al. [6] proved that linear network coding with
a finite alphabet is sufficient for optimal multicast by means of a vector space approach. Independently,
Koetter and Me´dard [7] developed an algebraic characterization of linear network coding by means of
a matrix approach. The above two approaches correspond to the global and local descriptions of linear
network coding, respectively. Jaggi et al. [8] further proposed a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm
for constructing a linear network code. We refer the reader to [9]–[13] for comprehensive discussions of
network coding.
A. Related Works
In the paradigm of network coding, information-theoretic security is naturally considered in the presence
of a wiretapper. This problem, called secure network coding problem, was introduced by Cai and Yeung in
[14], [15]. In the model of secure network coding over a wiretap network, i) the source node multicasts the
source message to all the sink nodes which as legal users are required to decode the source message with
zero error; and ii) the wiretapper, who can access any one wiretap set of edges, is not allowed to obtain
any information about the source message. The foregoing three classical information-theoretically secure
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3models [1]–[4] can be formulated as special cases of the above wiretap network model. In particular, a
wiretap network is called a r-wiretap network if the wiretapper can fully access any one edge subset of
size up to r, where r is a nonnegative integer, called the security level.
Similar to the coding for the foregoing classical information-theoretically secure models [1]–[4], in
secure network coding, it is necessary to randomize the source message to guarantee information-
theoretic security. Cai and Yeung [15] presented a code construction for r-wiretap networks. Subsequently,
El Rouayheb et al. [16] showed that the Cai-Yeung code construction can be viewed as a network
generalization of the code construction for wiretap channel II in [4]. Motivated by El Rouayheb et al.,
Silva and Kschischang [17] proposed a universal design of secure network codes via rank-metric codes,
in which the design of the linear network code for information transmission and the design of the code
at the source node for information-theoretic security are over a finite field and its extension, respectively,
so that the design of two codes can be separated. For secure network coding, the existing bounds on the
required alphabet size in [15]–[17] are roughly equal to the number of all wiretap sets, which is typically
too large for implementation in terms of computational complexity and storage requirement. Recently,
Guang and Yeung [18] developed a systematic graph-theoretic approach to improve the required alphabet
size for the existence of secure network codes and showed that the improvement in general is significant.
Secure network coding has also been investigated from different perspectives. Cheng and Yeung [19]
studied the fundamental performance bounds for secure network coding in a wiretap network model
where the collection of wiretap sets is arbitrary. Cui et al. [20] investigated the secure network coding
problem in a single-source single-sink network with unequal channel capacities, where randomness is
allowed to be generated at the non-source nodes. Furthermore, multi-source (multi-wiretapper) secure
network coding problem was also investigated in the literature, such as [21]–[23].
For secure network coding, besides information-theoretic security discussed above, some other notions
of security had also been considered in the literature. Bhattad and Narayanan [24] introduced weakly
secure network coding, in which “weak security” is defined as the requirement that the wiretapper cannot
recover any part of the source message. They also showed that we can use a weakly secure network code
without trading off the rate, implying that a random key is not needed for weakly secure network coding.
Another notion called strong security was introduced by Harada and Yamamoto [25], where a network
code is called r-strongly secure if the wiretapper cannot obtain any information about any subset ∆ of
the ω source symbols by accessing any edge subset of size up to ω + r − |∆|. Subsequently, Cai [26]
proposed strongly generic linear network codes and proved that such codes are r-strongly secure.
Another line of research follows the so-called Byzantine attacks [27]–[29], in which an adversary
is able to modify the messages transmitted on the edges of a network. Another related model is the
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4combination of secure network coding with network error correction coding, e.g., [17], [30]–[32], where
the source message is required to be protected from both wiretapping and (random or malicious) errors.
For an overview of secure network coding, we refer the reader to the two survey papers [33], [34].
B. Our Work
In a secure network coding system, the requirements for information transmission and information
security may vary. The information rate can change over time. For instance, the information source
generated at the source node may have different rates at different times. The required security level can
also change over time. For instance, the information source may be of different nature at different times,
and so is the confidentiality associated with it. It is desirable to transmit a less confidential information
source by using a secure network code with a lower security level, because a secure network code with
a high security level requires more randomness for the key. Note that in a cipher system, randomness
is a resource that needs to be optimized. Also as discussed above, there is an inherent tradeoff between
the information rate and the security level of a secure network code. With all these considerations, the
information rate and the security level of the system may need to be chosen differently at different times.
The straightforward approach is to use the existing code constructions to obtain a secure linear
network code (SLNC) for each pair of rate and security level. However, this approach has a number
of shortcomings. The construction of SLNCs for all the individual pairs of rate and security level incurs
a high computation cost. Each node on the network needs to store the local encoding kernels for all the
SLNCs, which incurs a high storage cost. The use of different SLNCs also causes an implementation
overhead. To be specific, in using the SLNCs, the source node needs to inform each non-source node
which rate and security level to use, and then each intermediate node needs to search for and apply the
corresponding local encoding kernel for local encoding. This solution not only is cumbersome but also
inefficient in terms of computation cost, storage cost, and implementation overhead.
To avoid the shortcomings of the above solution, in this paper we put forward local-encoding-preserving
secure network coding, where a family of SLNCs is called local-encoding-preserving if all the SLNCs
in this family share a common local encoding kernel at each intermediate node in the network. In other
words, the same local encoding kernel is used at each intermediate node regardless of which SLNC in
this family used. With this setup, the source node only needs to inform the sink nodes which SLNC in
the family is in use, and there is no need to change the coding operations at the intermediate nodes.
Our idea is to build a new SLNC on an existing SLNC so that not only both SLNCs are local-
encoding-preserving but also the new SLNC achieves another rate and security-level pair. To implement
the local-encoding-preserving property, we consider two structures of SLNC constructions in the literature.
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5One structure is to design an appropriate linear pre-coding operation at the source node upon a linear
network code, where the linear pre-coding operation is designed for information security and the linear
network code is constructed in advance for information transmission, e.g., [15], [35]; and the other is to
design an appropriate linear network code upon a linear pre-coding operation (regarded as a secure code)
at the source node, e.g., [16], [17]. The later structure is seemly infeasible for implementing the local-
encoding-preserving property because for this structure, once the secure code is changed for a different
rate and/or a different security level, the linear network code which depends on the secure code has to be
completely redesigned. In contrast, the former structure is feasible for implementing the local-encoding-
preserving property. For this structure, since the linear pre-coding operation at the source node is built
upon the linear network code constructed in advance, it is possible to only modify the linear pre-coding
operation at the source node to adjust to the change of the rate and/or security level while preserving
the local encoding kernels at the intermediate nodes. Besides, it has been proved in [15], [35] that for
this structure, the amount of randomness (entropy of the random key) required at the source node is the
minimum possible for the required security level.
We divide the presentation of the results into two parts. In the current paper (i.e., Part I), we design
(i) a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed security level and a flexible rate.
In the companion paper [36] (i.e., Part II), we design
(ii) a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed rate and a flexible security level;
(iii) a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed dimension (equal to the sum of rate and
security level) and a flexible pair of rate and security level.
It was proved in [15] that there exists an n-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level r (here
n = ω + r) on the network G if and only if ω + r ≤ Cmin, where Cmin is the smallest minimum cut
capacity between the source node and each sink node. The set of all such rate and security-level pairs
forms the rate and security-level region, as depicted in Fig. 1. By combining the constructions of the 3
families of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs described above in suitable ways, we can design a family
of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs that can be applied to all the pairs in the rate and security-level
region. This will be discussed at the end of Part II of the current paper [36].
C. Organization and Contributions of this Paper
The organization and main contributions of the paper are given as follows:
• In Section II, we formally present the network model, linear network coding, and secure network
coding with a construction of SLNC over a finite field of a reduced size. The necessary notation
and definitions are also introduced.
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Fig. 1: The rate and security-level region.
• Section III is devoted to designing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed security
level and a flexible rate. We present an efficient approach, which, upon any SLNC that exists, can
construct a local-encoding-preserving SLNC with the same security level and the rate reduced by
one. Then, starting with an SLNC with any fixed security level r and the allowed maximum rate
Cmin− r and applying the proposed approach repeatedly, we can obtain a family of local-encoding-
preserving SLNCs with the fixed security level r and multiple rates from Cmin − r to 0.
• Although this approach gives the prescription for designing a local-encoding-preserving SLNC with
the security level fixed and the rate reduced by one, it does not provide a method for efficient
implementation. To tackle this problem, in Section IV we develop a polynomial-time algorithm
for the efficient implementation of the approach. We also prove that the proposed approach and
algorithm do not incur any penalty on the required field size for the existence of SLNCs in terms
of the best known lower bound [18].
• We conclude in Section V with a summary of our results in the paper and an overview of the
companion paper [36].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Network Model
Let G = (V,E) be a finite directed acyclic network with a single source s and a set of sink nodes
T ⊆ V \ {s}, where V and E are the sets of nodes and edges of G, respectively. For a directed edge e
from node u to node v, the node u is called the tail of e and the node v is called the head of e, denoted
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7by tail(e) and head(e), respectively. Further, for a node u, define In(u) as the set of incoming edges
of u and Out(u) as the set of outgoing edges of u. Formally, In(u) = {e ∈ E : head(e) = u} and
Out(u) = {e ∈ E : tail(e) = u}. Without loss of generality, assume that there are no incoming edges for
the source node s and no outgoing edges for any sink node t ∈ T . For convenience sake, however, we let
In(s) be a set of n imaginary incoming edges, denoted by di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, terminating at the source node s
but without tail nodes, where the nonnegative integer n is equal to the dimension of the network code in
discussion. This will become clear later (see Definition 1). Then, we see that In(s) =
{
di : 1 ≤ i ≤ n
}
.
An index taken from an alphabet can be transmitted on each edge e in E. In other words, the capacity
of each edge is taken to be 1. Parallel edges between two adjacent nodes are allowed.
In a network G, a cut between the source node s and a non-source node t is defined as a set of edges
whose removal disconnects s from t. The capacity of a cut between s and t is defined as the number of
edges in the cut, and the minimum of the capacities of all the cuts between s and t is called the minimum
cut capacity between them, denoted by Ct. A cut between s and t is called a minimum cut if its capacity
achieves the minimum cut capacity between them.
These concepts can be extended from a non-source node t to an edge subset of E. We first need to
consider a cut between s and a set of non-source nodes T in the network G as follows. We create a new
node tT , and for every node t in T , add a new “super-edge” of infinite capacity
1 from t to tT (which
is equivalent to adding infinite parallel edges from t to tT ). A cut of finite capacity between s and tT is
considered as a cut between s and T . We can naturally extend the definitions of the capacity of a cut,
the minimum cut capacity, and the minimum cut to the case of T . Now, we consider an edge subset
A ⊆ E. For each edge e ∈ A, we introduce a node te which splits e into two edges e
1 and e2 with
tail(e1) = tail(e), head(e2) = head(e), and head(e1) = tail(e2) = te. Let TA = {te : e ∈ A}. Then a
cut between s and A is defined as a cut between s and TA, where, if e
1 or e2 appears in the cut, replace
it by e. Similarly, the minimum cut capacity between s and A, denoted by mincut(s,A), is defined as
the minimum cut capacity between s and TA, and a cut between s and A achieving the minimum cut
capacity mincut(s,A) is called a minimum cut.
B. Linear Network Coding
Linear network coding over a finite field is sufficient for achieving Cmin , mint∈T Ct, the theoretical
maximum information rate for multicast [6], [7]. We give the formal definition of a linear network code
as follows.
1Infinite symbols in the alphabet can be transmitted by one use of the edge.
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8Definition 1. Let Fq be a finite field of order q, where q is a prime power, and n be a nonnegative
integer. An n-dimensional Fq-valued linear network code Cn on the network G = (V,E) consists of an
Fq-valued |In(v)| × |Out(v)| matrix Kv = [kd,e]d∈In(v),e∈Out(v) for each non-sink node v in V , i.e.,
Cn =
{
Kv : v ∈ V \ T
}
,
where Kv is called the local encoding kernel of Cn at v, and kd,e ∈ Fq is called the local encoding
coefficient for the adjacent edge pair (d, e).
For a linear network code Cn, the local encoding kernels Kv at all the non-sink nodes v ∈ V \ T
induce an n-dimensional column vector ~f
(n)
e for each edge e in E, called the global encoding kernel
of e, which can be calculated recursively according to a given ancestral order of edges in E by
~f (n)e =
∑
d∈In(tail(e))
kd,e · ~f
(n)
d , (1)
with the boundary condition that ~f
(n)
d , d ∈ In(s) form the standard basis of the vector space F
n
q . The
set of global encoding kernels for all e ∈ E, i.e.,
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ E
}
, is also used to represent this linear
network code Cn. However, we remark that a set of global encoding kernels
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ E
}
may
correspond to more than one set of local encoding kernels
{
Kv : v ∈ V \ T
}
.
In using of this linear network code Cn, let x =
(
x1 x2 · · · xn
)
∈ Fnq be the input of the source
node s. We assume that the input x is transmitted to s through the n imaginary incoming channels of the
source node s. Without loss of generality, xi is transmitted on the ith imaginary channel di, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We use ye to denote the message transmitted on e, ∀ e ∈ E. Then ye can be calculated recursively by
the equation
ye =
∑
d∈In(tail(e))
kd,e · yd (2)
according to the given ancestral order of edges in E, with ydi , xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We see that ye in fact is
a linear combination of the n symbols xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n of x. It is readily seen that ydi = x ·
~f
(n)
di
(= xi),
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then it can be shown by induction via (1) and (2) that
ye = x · ~f
(n)
e , ∀ e ∈ E. (3)
Furthermore, for each sink node t ∈ T , we define the matrix F
(n)
t =
[
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ In(t)
]
. The sink node t
can decode the source message with zero error if and only if F
(n)
t is full rank, i.e., Rank
(
F
(n)
t
)
= n.
We say that an n-dimensional linear network code Cn is decodable if for each sink node t in T , the rank
of the matrix F
(n)
t is equal to the dimension n of the code, i.e., Rank
(
F
(n)
t
)
= n, ∀ t ∈ T . We refer the
reader to [9]–[13] for comprehensive discussions of linear network coding.
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9C. Secure Network Coding
Now, we present the secure network coding model. We assume that the source node s generates a
random source message M taking values in the message set Fωq according to the uniform distribution,
where the nonnegative integer ω is called the information rate. The source message M needs to be
multicast to each sink node t ∈ T , while being protected from a wiretapper who can access one but not
more than one arbitrary edge subset of size not larger than r, where the nonnegative integer r is called
the security level. The network G with a required security level r is called an r-wiretap network. Similar
to the other information-theoretically secure models, in our wiretap network model, it is necessary to
randomize the source message to combat the wiretapper. The randomness available at the source node,
called the key, is a random variable K that takes values in a set of keys Frq according to the uniform
distribution.
We consider secure linear network codes (SLNCs) on an r-wiretap network G. Let n = ω+r, the sum
of the information rate ω and the security level r. An Fq-valued n-dimensional SLNC on the r-wiretap
network G is an Fq-valued n-dimensional linear network on G such that the following decoding condition
and security condition are satisfied:
• decoding condition: every sink node can decode the source message M with zero error;
• security condition: the mutual information between YA and M is 0, i.e., I(YA;M) = 0, for any
edge subset A ⊆ E with |A| ≤ r, where we denote by Ye the random variable transmitted on the
edge e that is a linear function of the random source messageM and the random key K, and denote
(Ye : e ∈ A) by YA for an edge subset A ⊆ E.
The nonnegative integers ω and r are also referred to as the information rate and security level of this
Fq-valued SLNC, respectively. The sum of the rate ω and security level r is the dimension n of this
Fq-valued SLNC. In particular, it was proved in [35] that F
r
q is the minimum set of keys to guarantee
the security level of r for any valid information rate ω for 1 ≤ ω ≤ Cmin − r. When r = 0, the secure
network coding model reduces to the original network coding model.
D. SLNC Construction
We present the SLNC construction of Cai and Yeung [15]. Let ω and r be the information rate and
the security level, respectively, and n = ω+ r ≤ Cmin. Let Cn be an n-dimensional linear network code
over a finite field Fq on the network G, of which all global encoding kernels are ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E.
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We use Er to denote the set of the edge subsets of size not larger than r, i.e., Er = {A ⊆ E : |A| ≤ r}.
Let ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω be ω linearly independent column vectors in Fnq such that〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, 2 ∀ A ∈ Er. (4)
Let ~b
(n)
ω+1,
~b
(n)
ω+2, · · · ,
~b
(n)
n be another n − ω column vectors in Fnq such that
~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
n are
linearly independent, and then let Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
.
Let m, a row ω-vector in Fωq , be the value of the source message M , and k, a row r-vector in F
r
q,
be the value of the random key K. Then x =
(
m k
)
is the input of the source node s. At the source
node s, x is first linearly encoded to x′ = x ·
(
Q(n)
)−1
, and then apply the linear network code Cn to
multicast x′ through the network G to all the sink nodes. With this setting, it was proved in [15] that
this coding scheme not only multicasts the source message M to all the sink nodes at the rate ω but
also achieves the security level r. According to Theorem 1 subsequently, this n-dimensional SLNC with
the rate ω and security level r is denoted by
(
Q(n)
)−1
· Cn, and all the global encoding kernels of this
SLNC are
(
Q(n)
)−1
· ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E.
E. Field Size Reduction of the SLNC Construction
Let A ⊆ E be an edge subset. If A satisfies |A| = mincut(s,A), then we say that A is regular.
Consider an arbitrary edge subset A (not necessarily regular) with |A| ≤ r, and replace A by a minimum
cut CUTA between s and A. Apparently, CUTA is regular and still satisfies |CUTA| ≤ r. A secure
network code which is secure for CUTA is also secure for A, namely that I(YCUTA ;M) = 0 implies
I(YA;M) = 0, since YA is a deterministic function of YCUTA by the mechanism of network coding.
Thus, for the foregoing security condition, it suffices to consider all the regular edge subsets A ⊆ E with
|A| ≤ r. Furthermore, for any regular edge subset A ⊆ E with |A| < r, there must exist a regular edge
subset B with |B| = r such that A ( B. By the same argument discussed above, it in fact suffices to
consider all the regular edge subsets A ⊆ E with |A| = r for the security condition.
Let A and A′ be two regular edge subsets with |A| = |A′| = r. Define a binary relation “∼” between
A and A′: A ∼ A′ if and only if there exists an edge set CUT which is a minimum cut between s and A
and also between s and A′, that is, A and A′ have a common minimum cut between the source node s
and each of them. It was proved in Guang et al. [37] that “∼” is an equivalence relation. With the relation
“∼”, the collection of all the regular edge subsets of size r can be partitioned into equivalence classes.
Guang and Yeung [18] proved that each equivalence class contains a unique common minimum cut of
2Here we use 〈L〉 to denote the subspace spanned by the vectors in a set L of vectors. Furthemore, we always use ~0 to denote
an all-zero column vector in the paper, whose dimension is clear from the context.
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all the edge subsets inside. Moreover, this common minimum cut is the primary minimum cut between s
and any edge subset in this equivalence class, where a minimum cut between s and an edge subset A is
primary if it separates s and all the minimum cuts between s and A. Such a primary minimum cut is
unique and can be found in polynomial time.
Furthermore, we say an edge subset is primary if this edge subset is the primary minimum cut between s
and itself. By using the foregoing argument again, we see that for the security condition, it suffices to
consider all the primary edge subsets of size r. Precisely, we can replace (4) by the following: we use
Ar to denote the set of the primary edge subsets of size r, i.e.,
Ar = {A ⊆ E : A is primary and |A| = r},
3
and let ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω be ω linearly independent column vectors in Fnq such that〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar. (5)
It was also showed in [18] that |Ar|, as a new lower bound on the field size for the existence of SLNCs,
improves the previous one
(|E|
r
)
(≤ |Er| clearly), and the improvement can be significant.
III. SECURE NETWORK CODING FOR FIXED SECURITY LEVEL AND FLEXIBLE RATE
In this section, we consider the problem of designing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs
for a fixed information rate and a security level.
A. Decoding Condition
We first consider in this subsection the decoding condition under the preservation of the local encoding
mappings. Let n be a nonnegative integer not larger than Cmin = mint∈T Ct, and Cn be an n-dimensional
linear network code over a finite field Fq on the network G. First, we show the existence of a family of
local-encoding-preserving decodable linear network codes in which the linear network codes have distinct
dimensions.
Theorem 1. Let Cn =
{
Kv : v ∈ V \ T
}
be an n-dimensional decodable linear network code over a
finite field Fq on the network G = (V,E), of which the global encoding kernels are ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E. Let Q
be an m × n (m ≤ n) matrix over Fq and Q · Cn =
{
K
(Q)
v : v ∈ V \ T
}
with K
(Q)
s = Q · Ks and
K
(Q)
v = Kv for all v ∈ V \ ({s} ∪ T ). Then Q · Cn is an m-dimensional linear network code over Fq on
G, of which the global encoding kernels are Q · ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E. This linear network code Q · Cn is called
3We refer the reader to Example 1 in Section IV for illustrations of Ar .
November 7, 2018 DRAFT
12
the transformation of Cn by the matrix Q. In particular, Q · Cn is decodable provided that Q is full row
rank, i.e., Rank
(
Q
)
= m.
Proof: Clearly, Q · Cn is an m-dimensional linear network code over Fq on G by Definition 1. Let{
~f
(m)
e (Q) : e ∈ E
}
be the set of all the global encoding kernels with respect to the linear network code
Q · Cn. It suffices to prove that
~f (m)e (Q) = Q ·
~f (n)e , ∀ e ∈ Out(v) (6)
for all non-sink nodes v, because for any e ∈ E, we have e ∈ Out(v) for some non-sink node v. This
will be done by induction on the non-sink nodes according to any given ancestral order of the nodes
in V . First, consider the source node s and obtain[
~f (m)e (Q) : e ∈ Out(s)
]
= K(Q)s = Q ·Ks =
[
Q · ~f (n)e : e ∈ Out(s)
]
.
Now, consider an intermediate node u in V \ ({s} ∪ T ) and assume that (6) is satisfied for all non-sink
nodes v before u according to the given ancestral order of the nodes. By the induction hypothesis, we
have [
~f (m)e (Q) : e ∈ Out(u)
]
=
[
~f
(m)
d (Q) : d ∈ In(u)
]
·K(Q)u
=
[
Q · ~f
(n)
d : d ∈ In(u)
]
·Ku = Q ·
[
~f
(n)
d : d ∈ In(u)
]
·Ku
= Q ·
[
~f (n)e : e ∈ Out(u)
]
=
[
Q · ~f (n)e : e ∈ Out(u)
]
.
We thus proved that ~f
(m)
e (Q) = Q · ~f
(n)
e for all edges e in E.
On the other hand, for each sink node t, the matrix F
(n)
t in Cn becomes the matrix[
Q · ~f (n)e : e ∈ In(t)
]
= Q · F
(n)
t
in Q ·Cn. The decodability of Cn implies that Rank
(
F
(n)
t
)
= n. Hence, we see that Rank
(
Q ·F
(n)
t
)
= m
provided that the matrix Q is full row rank, i.e., Rank
(
Q
)
= m. The theorem is proved.
The following corollary is a straightforward application of Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. Let Cn be an n-dimensional decodable linear network code over the finite field Fq on the
network G = (V,E), of which the global encoding kernels are ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E. Let ~ℓ be an arbitrary column
(n− 1)-vector in Fn−1q and In−1 stand for the (n− 1)× (n− 1) identity matrix. Then
Cn−1 ,
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
· Cn
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is an (n − 1)-dimensional decodable linear network code over Fq on G with the same local encoding
kernels at the intermediate nodes as the original code Cn, and all the global kernels of Cn−1 are
~f (n−1)e (
~ℓ) ,
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
· ~f (n)e , ∀ e ∈ E. (7)
Remark 3. Corollary 2 is essentially the same as Fong and Yeung [38, Lemma 1], in which this result
was proved by using global encoding kernels. A similar but more complicated result in network error
correction coding is Lemma 3 in [39], which correspondingly was proved by using the extended global
encoding kernels.
B. Security Condition
In this subsection, we focus on how to guarantee the fixed security level for a family of local-encoding-
preserving SLNCs with multiple rates.
Based on Corollary 2 and the construction of an SLNC in Sections II-D and II-E, we can construct a
family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with the same security level r and information rates ω from 1
to Cmin − r as follows.
4 Let CCmin be a Cmin-dimensional decodable linear network code over Fq on G.
Such a linear network code can be constructed in polynomial time (e.g., [8]). By Corollary 2, we can
obtain a family of local-encoding-preserving linear network codes
{
Cn : n = Cmin, Cmin−1, · · · , r+1
}
of dimensions from Cmin to r + 1, all of which are decodable. Next, for each n-dimensional linear
network code Cn in this family, construct an n × n invertible matrix Q
(n) satisfying (5). Thus, we can
obtain a family of SLNCs
{
(Q(n))−1 · Cn : n = Cmin, Cmin− 1, · · · , r+1
}
of the same security level r
and rates from Cmin− r to 1, and all of them have the same local encoding kernels at all the non-source
nodes by Theorem 1. However, this approach not only requires the construction of the matrix Q(n) for
each n, incurring a high computational complexity, but also requires the source node s to store all the
matrices Q(n) for each n.5
To avoid these shortcomings, in the following we give a more efficient approach to solve the problem.
We consider an n-dimensional linear network code Cn, of which all the global encoding kernels are ~f
(n)
e ,
e ∈ E. For any fixed column (n− 1)-vector ~ℓ, let
Cn−1 =
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
· Cn =
{
~f (n−1)e (
~ℓ) : e ∈ E
}
.
4Under the requirement of the security level r, the allowed maximum information rate is Cmin − r.
5The computational complexity of the construction of Q(n) is shown to be O
(
ωn3|Ar|+ ωn|Ar|
2 + rn2
)
in Appendix A,
and the storage cost is O
(
n2
)
.
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By Corollary 2, Cn−1 is an (n − 1)-dimensional linear network code and has the same local encoding
kernels as Cn at all the non-source nodes. On the other hand, by the construction of an SLNC in
Sections II-D and II-E, the ω linearly independent column n-vectors ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω satisfying (5)
guarantee the security level r. Our idea is to design an appropriate column (n− 1)-vector ~ℓ to obtain ω
column (n− 1)-vectors
~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ) =
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
·~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω,
such that (ω − 1) vectors among them, e.g., ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, are linearly independent, and the
corresponding condition (5) for the rate ω − 1 is satisfied, i.e.,
〈
~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ) : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1
〉⋂〈
~f (n−1)e (
~ℓ) : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar. (8)
With this, we can construct an (n−1)-dimensional SLNC that achieves a security level of r and the lower
information rate ω − 1, and has the same local encoding kernels as (Q(n))−1 · Cn at all the non-source
nodes. Note that Ks (of size ω × |Out(s)|), the local encoding kernel at the source node s, needs to be
updated to K
(n−1)
s (~ℓ) (of size (ω − 1)× |Out(s)|). This will be discussed later.
Before presenting our approach, we first give some notations to be used frequently throughout the paper.
Let Cn be an n-dimensional decodable linear network code over a finite field Fq on the network G, of
which all the global encoding kernels are ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E. Let Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
be an n× n
invertible matrix satisfying (5), i.e., (Q(n))−1 · Cn is an SLNC over Fq on G with information rate ω and
security level r.
Define two types of vector spaces as follows:
L
(n)
A =
〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
, A ⊆ E
B
(n)
i =
〈
~b
(n)
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ i
〉
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Furthermore, for a column (n− 1)-vector ~ℓ ∈ Fn−1q , recall that
~f (n−1)e (
~ℓ) =
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
· ~f (n)e , e ∈ E,
~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ) =
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
·~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
and define two types of vector spaces similarly:
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) =
〈
~f (n−1)e (
~ℓ) : e ∈ A
〉
, A ⊆ E,
B
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ) =
〈
~b
(n−1)
j (
~ℓ) : 1 ≤ j ≤ i
〉
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In particular, for ~ℓ = ~0, let
~f (n−1)e =
~f (n−1)e (~0) =
[
In−1 ~0
]
· ~f (n)e , e ∈ E, (9)
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~b
(n−1)
i =
~b
(n−1)
i (
~0) =
[
In−1 ~0
]
·~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (10)
i.e., ~f
(n−1)
e (resp. ~b
(n−1)
i ) is the sub-vector of
~f
(n)
e (resp. ~b
(n)
i ) containing the first (n− 1) components,
and
L
(n−1)
A =
〈
~f (n−1)e : e ∈ A
〉
, A ⊆ E, (11)
B
(n−1)
i =
〈
~b
(n−1)
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ i
〉
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (12)
Now, we present our approach in detail. By (10), we first compute[
~b
(n−1)
1
~b
(n−1)
2 · · ·
~b (n−1)ω
]
=
[
In−1 ~0
]
·
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b (n)ω
]
, (13)
which, together with the linear independence of ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω , implies that
Rank
( [
~b
(n−1)
1
~b
(n−1)
2 · · ·
~b (n−1)ω
] )
≥ ω − 1.
In other words, there must exist ω−1 vectors out of~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω are linearly independent. Without
loss of generality, we assume that ~b
(n−1)
1 ,
~b
(n−1)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n−1)
ω−1 are linearly independent.
Furthermore, with the global encoding kernels ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E of Cn, we partition Ar into the following
two disjoint subsets:
A
′
r = {A ∈ Ar : the n− 1 vectors
~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f (n−1)e , e ∈ A, are linearly dependent},
and
A
′′
r = {A ∈ Ar : the n− 1 vectors
~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f (n−1)e , e ∈ A, are linearly independent}.
The following two lemmas give the prescriptions of designing the column (n − 1)-vectors ~ℓ for A ′r
and A ′′r , respectively.
Lemma 4. Let ~b
(n−1)
1 ,
~b
(n−1)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n−1)
ω−1 be ω − 1 linearly independent column (n − 1)-vectors over
a finite field Fq, where n = ω + r. For any column (n− 1)-vector ~ℓ ∈ F
n−1
q such that
~ℓ ∈ Fn−1q \
⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
)
, (14)
then the following are satisfied:
• the column (n− 1)-vectors ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, are linearly independent;
• B
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ)
⋂
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) = {~0}, ∀ A ∈ A ′r .
November 7, 2018 DRAFT
16
Proof: Let ~ℓ be an arbitrary column (n − 1)-vector satisfying (14). We first prove that ~b
(n−1)
1 (
~ℓ),
~b
(n−1)
2 (
~ℓ), · · · , ~b
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ) are linearly independent. Let ~b
(n)
i =
[
bi,1 bi,2 · · · bi,n
]⊤
, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1.
Assume that α1, α2, · · · , αω−1 are ω − 1 elements in Fq such that
~0 =
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ) =
ω−1∑
i=1
αi(~b
(n−1)
i + bi,n
~ℓ), (15)
or equivalently,
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i = −
( ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n
)
· ~ℓ, (16)
where we note that bi,n is the last component of ~b
(n)
i . By (14), we have
~ℓ /∈ B
(n−1)
ω−1 , which, together with
(16), implies that
∑ω−1
i=1 αibi,n = 0 and
∑ω−1
i=1 αi
~b
(n−1)
i =
~0. Thus, we obtain
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n)
i =
ω−1∑
i=1
αi

~b (n−1)i
bi,n

 = ~0,
which implies that αi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ω− 1 since ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω−1 are linearly independent. We
thus have proved that ~b
(n−1)
1 (
~ℓ), ~b
(n−1)
2 (
~ℓ), · · · , ~b
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ) are linearly independent.
Next, we prove that B
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ)
⋂
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) = {~0} for all A ∈ A ′r . We assume the contrary that there
exists a wiretap set A ∈ A ′r such that
B
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ)
⋂
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) 6= {~0}. (17)
Let ~v ∈ Fn−1q be a nonzero vector in this intersection. Then, we have β1, β2, · · · , βω−1 in Fq, not all
zero, such that
~v =
ω−1∑
i=1
βi~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ) =
ω−1∑
i=1
βi(~b
(n−1)
i + bi,n
~ℓ), (18)
and another r elements in Fq, denoted by γe, e ∈ A, which are not all zero, such that
~v =
∑
e∈A
γe ~f
(n−1)
e (
~ℓ) =
∑
e∈A
γe(~f
(n−1)
e + fe,n
~ℓ), (19)
where fe,n is the last component of ~f
(n)
e . By (18) and (19), we immediately obtain(
ω−1∑
i=1
βi~b
(n−1)
i −
∑
e∈A
γe ~f
(n−1)
e
)
+
(
ω−1∑
i=1
βibi,n −
∑
e∈A
γefe,n
)
· ~ℓ = ~0.
Together with ~ℓ /∈ B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A from (14) (which implies
~ℓ 6= ~0), we further have
ω−1∑
i=1
βibi,n −
∑
e∈A
γefe,n = 0 and
ω−1∑
i=1
βi~b
(n−1)
i −
∑
e∈A
γe ~f
(n−1)
e = ~0, (20)
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or equivalently,
ω−1∑
i=1
βibi,n =
∑
e∈A
γefe,n and
ω−1∑
i=1
βi~b
(n−1)
i =
∑
e∈A
γe ~f
(n−1)
e . (21)
Now, we can write (21) in vector form as
ω−1∑
i=1
βi

~b (n−1)i
bi,n

 =∑
e∈A
γe

~f (n−1)e
fe,n

 , (22)
namely,
ω−1∑
i=1
βi~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
γe ~f
(n)
e . (23)
Together with the linear independence of ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
ω−1, we obtain
~0 6=
ω−1∑
i=1
βi~b
(n)
i =
∑
e∈A
γe ~f
(n)
e , (24)
since β1, β2, · · · , βω−1 are not all zero. This implies that B
(n)
ω−1
⋂
L
(n)
A 6= {
~0}, a contradiction to (5).
The lemma is proved.
Lemma 5. Let ~b
(n−1)
1 ,
~b
(n−1)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n−1)
ω−1 be ω − 1 linearly independent column (n − 1)-vectors over
a finite field Fq, where n = ω+ r. For each wiretap set A ∈ A
′′
r , define a set of column (n− 1)-vectors
as follows:
KA =
{
~k =
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e : ∀
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q
s.t.
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n = −1
}
,
(25)
where ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ A, are r n-dimensional global encoding kernels of the r edges in A, and fe,n is the
last component of ~f
(n)
e . Then, for any column (n − 1)-vector ~ℓ ∈ Fn−1q \
⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA, the following are
satisfied:
• the column (n− 1)-vectors ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, are linearly independent;
• B
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ)
⋂
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) = {~0}, ∀ A ∈ A ′′r .
Proof: Let A be an arbitrary edge subset in A ′′r . In order to find a column vector
~ℓ ∈ Fn−1q such
that ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, are linearly independent and B
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ)
⋂
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) = {~0}, it suffices to
find a column vector ~ℓ such that the ω − 1 + r vectors ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, ~f
(n−1)
e (~ℓ), e ∈ A, are
linearly independent, or equivalently
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ) +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e (
~ℓ) 6= ~0, (26)
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for any nonzero vector
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q (here n = ω + r). Further, we write (26)
as:
ω−1∑
i=1
αi
(
~b
(n−1)
i + bi,n
~ℓ
)
+
∑
e∈A
βe
(
~f (n−1)e + fe,n
~ℓ
)
6= ~0,
or equivalently,
−
( ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)
· ~ℓ 6=
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e . (27)
Based on (27), we consider the following two cases:
Case 1: Consider those nonzero vectors
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q such that
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n = 0. (28)
By (28), the LHS in (27) is always a zero vector. On the other hand, since
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω−1, βe, e ∈ A
)
is nonzero, and the vectors ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e , e ∈ A, are linearly independent, the RHS in
(27) is nonzero. Thus, (27) always holds for any ~ℓ in Case 1.
Case 2: Consider those nonzero vectors
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q such that
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n 6= 0.
Clearly, (27) holds for Case 2 if and only if:
~ℓ 6= −
( ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)−1
·
( ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e
)
.
Now we let
KA =
{
~k = −
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)−1
·
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e
)
:
∀
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q \ {~0} s.t.
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n 6= 0
}
.
(29)
Combining the two cases above, we have proved that for any ~ℓ ∈ Fn−1q \KA, the ω− 1 column (n− 1)-
vectors ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, are linearly independent, and B
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ)
⋂
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) = {~0}. Upon
proving that KA = KA and considering all the edge subsets A ∈ A
′′
r , the lemma is proved.
We now prove that KA = KA (cf. (25) for KA). Clearly, we have KA ⊆ KA. To prove KA ⊆ KA, we
consider any column (n− 1)-vector ~k in KA. For this ~k, there exists a row (n− 1)-vector
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤
ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
in Fn−1q such that
∑ω−1
i=1 αibi,n +
∑
e∈A βefe,n 6= 0 and
~k = −
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)−1
·
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e
)
.
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Let
α′i = −
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)−1
· αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
and
β′e = −
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)−1
· βe, ∀ e ∈ A.
Then we have
~k =
ω−1∑
i=1
α′i
~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
β′e
~f (n−1)e ,
and
ω−1∑
i=1
α′ibi,n +
∑
e∈A
β′efe,n = −
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)−1
·
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)
= −1.
This implies ~k ∈ KA, proving that KA ⊆ KA. We thus have proved that KA = KA.
The following theorem gives the prescription for designing the vector ~ℓ.
Theorem 6. Let ~b
(n−1)
1 ,
~b
(n−1)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n−1)
ω−1 be ω − 1 linearly independent column (n− 1)-vectors over
a finite field Fq of order q > |Ar|, where n = ω + r. Then, the set
Fn−1q \
[ ⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
) ⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA
]
(30)
is nonempty, and for any column (n− 1)-vector ~ℓ in this set, the following are satisfied:
• the column (n− 1)-vectors ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ), 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, are linearly independent;
• B
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ)
⋂
L
(n−1)
A (
~ℓ) = {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar, i.e., the security condition in (8).
Proof: We only need prove that the set (30) is nonempty if the field size q > |Ar|. The rest of the
theorem are immediate consequences of Lemmas 4 and 5.
First, for an edge subset A ∈ A ′r , the n − 1 column (n − 1)-vectors
~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e ,
e ∈ A, are linearly dependent. Then we have
dim
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
)
≤ (ω − 1 + r)− 1 = n− 2,
and consequently, ∣∣∣B(n−1)ω−1 + L(n−1)A ∣∣∣ ≤ qn−2.
Now, for an edge subset A in A ′′r , we consider any two vectors
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
and(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
in Fn−1q such that
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n = −1 and
ω−1∑
i=1
α′ibi,n +
∑
e∈A
β′efe,n = −1. (31)
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Let
~k =
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e (32)
and
~k ′ =
ω−1∑
i=1
α′i
~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
β′e
~f (n−1)e . (33)
We will prove that ~k = ~k ′ if and only if
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
=
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
.
The “if” part is evident. For the “only if” part, since ~k = ~k ′, it follows from (32) and (33) that
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e =
ω−1∑
i=1
α′i
~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
β′e
~f (n−1)e . (34)
Note that the n−1 column (n−1)-vectors ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω−1,
~f
(n−1)
e , e ∈ A, are linearly independent
(since A ∈ A ′′r ), and so they form a basis of the vector space F
n−1
q . Therefore, by (34), we immediately
obtain that
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
and
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
are equal.
Therefore, the cardinality of KA is equal to the number of the vectors
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈
A
)
∈ Fn−1q such that
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n = −1, (35)
that is, |KA| = q
n−2.
Thus, we have proved that 

∣∣B(n−1)ω−1 + L(n−1)A ∣∣ ≤ qn−2, ∀ A ∈ A ′r ;
|KA| = q
n−2, ∀ A ∈ A ′′r .
So, if q > |Ar|, we have ∣∣∣∣∣∣Fn−1q \

 ⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
) ⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA


∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Fn−1q ∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
) ⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ qn−1 −
( ∑
A∈A ′
r
qn−2 +
∑
A∈A ′′
r
qn−2
)
= qn−1 − |Ar| · q
n−2
= qn−2(q − |Ar|)
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> 0.
The theorem is proved.
Now, by Theorem 6, the column (n− 1)-vector ~ℓ can be taken to be any vector in the set in (30). Let
Q(n−1)(~ℓ) =
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
·Q(n) =
[
~b
(n−1)
1 (
~ℓ) ~b
(n−1)
2 (
~ℓ) · · · ~b (n−1)n (
~ℓ)
]
.
Then we have Rank
(
Q(n−1)(~ℓ)
)
= n− 1 since Rank
(
Q(n)
)
= n. Furthermore, together with the linear
independence of ~b
(n−1)
1 (
~ℓ), ~b
(n−1)
2 (
~ℓ), · · · , ~b
(n−1)
ω−1 (
~ℓ) from Theorem 6, there exist r column vectors in
the last r+1 column vectors of Q(n−1)(~ℓ), say ~b
(n−1)
ω (~ℓ), ~b
(n−1)
ω+1 (
~ℓ), · · · , ~b
(n−1)
n−1 (
~ℓ), such that ~b
(n−1)
1 (
~ℓ),
~b
(n−1)
2 (
~ℓ), · · · , ~b
(n−1)
n−1 (
~ℓ) are linearly independent. Immediately, we obtain an (n−1)× (n−1) invertible
matrix
Q(n−1) =
[
~b
(n−1)
1 (
~ℓ) ~b
(n−1)
2 (
~ℓ) · · · ~b
(n−1)
n−1 (
~ℓ)
]
.
Therefore, we have constructed an (n− 1)-dimensional SLNC
(Q(n−1))−1 · Cn−1 = (Q
(n−1))−1 ·
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
· Cn =
{
(Q(n−1))−1 · ~f (n−1)e (
~ℓ) : e ∈ E
}
,
which not only achieves the information rate ω − 1 and security level of r, but also has the same local
encoding kernels as the original n-dimensional SLNC (Q(n))−1 · Cn at all the non-source nodes.
IV. AN ALGORITHM FOR CODE CONSTRUCTION
In the last section, we have presented an approach for designing a family of local-encoding-preserving
SLNCs for a fixed security level and multiple rates. In particular, Theorem 6 gives the prescription for
designing an appropriate vector ~ℓ that is crucial for constructing a local-encoding-preserving SLNC with
rate reduced by one. However, Theorem 6 does not provide a method to find ~ℓ readily. The following
Algorithm 1 provides an efficient method to find ~ℓ and gives a polynomial-time implementation for
constructing an (n−1)-dimensional SLNC with rate ω−1 and security level r (here n = ω+ r) from an
n-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level r, and the two SLNCs have the same local encoding
kernel at each intermediate node.
Starting with an SLNC with a security level r and accordingly the maximum rate Cmin − r and then
using Algorithm 1 repeatedly, we can obtain a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with the fixed
security level r and rates from Cmin − r to 0. This procedure is illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Algorithm 1: Construction of a rate-(ω − 1) and security-level-r SLNC from a rate-ω and security-
level-r SLNC, both of which have the same local encoding kernels at all the non-source nodes.
Input: An n-dimensional linear network code Cn of global encoding kernels ~f
(n)
e , e ∈ E over a finite field
Fq of order q > |Ar|, and an Fq-valued n× n invertible matrix Q
(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
such that
(Q(n))−1 · Cn is an n-dimensional SLNC with rate ω and security level r, where n = ω + r.
Output: Matrices Q(n−1) and K
(n−1)
s (~ℓ) corresponding to the linear encoding operation and the local
encoding kernel at the source node, respectively.
// The linear encoding operation corresponding to Q(n−1) at the source node, the updated local encoding
kernel K
(n−1)
s (~ℓ) at the source node, and the unchanged local encoding kernels at all the non-source nodes
together constitute an (n− 1)-dimensional SLNC of rate ω − 1 and security level r.
begin
1 choose ω − 1 linearly independent vectors in ~b
(n−1)
1 ,
~b
(n−1)
2 ,· · · ,
~b
(n−1)
ω , say ~b
(n−1)
1 ,
~b
(n−1)
2 ,· · · ,
~b
(n−1)
ω−1
without loss of generality;
2 partition Ar into A
′
r and A
′′
r ;
3 choose a column (n− 1)-vector ~h ∈ Fn−1q \
⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
)
;
4 for each A ∈ A ′′r do
5 calculate the unique row (n− 1)-vector
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q such that
~h =
∑ω−1
i=1 αi
~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A βe
~f
(n−1)
e ;
6 compute θA =
∑ω−1
i=1 αibi,n +
∑
e∈A βefe,n;
end
7 choose a nonzero element θ in Fq such that θ · θA 6= −1, ∀ A ∈ A
′′
r ;
8 calculate the vector ~ℓ = θ~h; // ~ℓ ∈ Fn−1q \
[⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
)⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA
]
.
9 compute K
(n−1)
s (~ℓ) =
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
·Ks; // K
(n−1)
s (~ℓ) =
[
~f
(n−1)
e (~ℓ) : e ∈ Out(s)
]
.
10 compute Q(n−1)(~ℓ) =
[
In−1 ~ℓ
]
·Q(n); // Q(n−1)(~ℓ) =
[
~b
(n−1)
1 (
~ℓ) ~b
(n−1)
2 (
~ℓ) · · · ~b
(n−1)
n (~ℓ)
]
.
11 remove a column vector from the last r + 1 (here r = n− ω) vectors of Q(n−1)(~ℓ), i.e., ~b
(n−1)
i (
~ℓ),
ω ≤ i ≤ n, such that the remaining (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix, denoted by Q(n−1), is invertible;
12 return Q(n−1) and K
(n−1)
s (~ℓ).
// Now, (Q(n−1))−1 · Cn−1 is an Fq-valued SLNC with security level r and rate ω − 1, and has the same local
encoding kernels as (Q(n))−1 · Cn at all the non-source nodes. However, note that the calculation of all the global
encoding kernels of Cn−1, i.e., ~f
(n−1)
e (~ℓ), e ∈ E, is not necessary. Instead, we only need to compute K
(n−1)
s (~ℓ),
the new local encoding kernel at the source node s, and continue to use the original local encoding coefficients at
each non-source node for encoding.
end
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r
0
ω
Cmin
Cmin
r
Fig. 2: Local-encoding-preserving SLNCs for a fixed security-level and a flexible rate.
Verification of Algorithm 1:
For the purpose of verifying Algorithm 1, it suffices to verify that the column (n− 1)-vector ~ℓ chosen
in Line 8 is in the set in (30), i.e.,
~ℓ ∈ Fn−1q \
[ ⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
) ⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA
]
. (36)
First, let ~h be the column (n− 1)-vector in Fn−1q \
⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 +L
(n−1)
A
)
that has been chosen in
Line 5. Note that
~ℓ = θ~h ∈ Fn−1q \
⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
)
, (37)
where θ is as chosen in Line 7.
Now, consider any wiretap set A ∈ A ′′r . It follows that
~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e , e ∈ A, are
n− 1 linearly independent column (n− 1)-vectors, and thus form a basis of the vector space Fn−1q . So
there exists the unique row (n− 1)-vector
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
such that
~h =
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e .
We prove in the following that the vector ~ℓ = θ~h calculated in Line 8 is not equal to any vector
~k ′ ∈
⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA. Fix any A ∈ A
′′
r and consider any
~k ′ ∈ KA. Let
~k ′ =
ω−1∑
i=1
α′i
~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
β′e
~f (n−1)e ,
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where
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
is a row (n− 1)-vector such that
ω−1∑
i=1
α′ibi,n +
∑
e∈A
β′efe,n = −1. (38)
Note that
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω− 1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
is unique because ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e , e ∈ A, form
a basis of Fn−1q (since A ∈ A
′′
r ).
Case 1:
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
and
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
are linearly independent.
By the linear independence of ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e , e ∈ A, the column (n− 1)-vectors ~h and
~k ′ are linearly independent, and immediately we have ~ℓ = θ~h 6= ~k ′ for any nonzero element θ in Fq.
Case 2:
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
and
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
are linearly dependent. Let
θA =
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n.
We now prove ~ℓ = θ~h 6= ~k ′, where θ is as chosen in Line 7. Note that
ω−1∑
i=1
(θαi) bi,n +
∑
e∈A
(θβe) fe,n = θ ·
(
ω−1∑
i=1
αibi,n +
∑
e∈A
βefe,n
)
= θ · θA 6= −1.
Together with (38), this implies that θ
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω−1, βe, e ∈ A
)
and
(
α′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω−1, β
′
e, e ∈ A
)
are not equal (but linearly dependent). By the linear independence of ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e ,
e ∈ A, this further implies
θ~h =
ω−1∑
i=1
(θαi)~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
(θβe)~f
(n−1)
e 6=
ω−1∑
i=1
α′i
~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
β′e
~f (n−1)e =
~k ′.
Combining the above two cases, we have proved that ~ℓ /∈ KA for all A ∈ A
′′
r . Together with (37), we
have verified that ~ℓ is in the set in (30).
We now give an example to illustrate Algorithm 1.
Example 1. Consider the network G = (V,E) depicted in Fig. 3. Let
C3 =
{
Ks =
[
0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1
1 1 2 2
]
, K1 = K2 = K4 = [ 1 1 ] , K3 =
[
4
1
]}
(39)
be a 3-dimensional linear network code over the field F5 on G, where we use Ks and Ki to denote the
local encoding kernels at the source node s and the intermediate nodes vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, respectively. We
use ~f
(3)
i to denote the global encoding kernels of the edges ei for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 11, which according to (1)
are calculated as follows:
~f
(3)
1 =
[
0
1
1
]
, ~f
(3)
2 =
~f
(3)
5 =
~f
(3)
6 =
[
1
0
1
]
, ~f
(3)
3 =
~f
(3)
7 =
~f
(3)
8 =
[
1
0
2
]
,
~f
(3)
4 =
[
0
1
2
]
, ~f
(3)
9 =
~f
(3)
10 =
~f
(3)
11 =
[
0
0
1
]
.
(40)
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s
v1 v2
v3
v4
t1 t2
e2 e3
e5
e6 e7
e8e9
e10 e11
e1 e4
Fig. 3: The network G = (V,E).
Consider rate ω = 2 and security level r = 1. The set of the primary edge subsets of size 1 is
A1 =
{
{e1}, {e2}, {e3}, {e4}, {e9}
}
.
Let
Q(3) =
[
~b
(3)
1
~b
(3)
2
~b
(3)
3
]
=
[
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
]
,
which is clearly invertible. Furthermore, we see that the following are satisfied:
〈
~b
(3)
1 ,
~b
(3)
2
〉⋂〈
~f
(3)
i
〉
= {~0}, ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, i.e., ∀ A ∈ A1.
Thus, (Q(3))−1 · C3 = C3 is an F5-valued 3-dimensional SLNC with security level 1 and rate 2.
In the following, we will use Algorithm 1 to construct an F5-valued SLNC with the fixed security level
1 and a lower rate ω−1 = 1, which also has the same local encoding kernels as the SLNC (Q(3))−1 · C3
at all the non-source nodes. Note that ~b
(2)
1 =
[
1
0
]
is nonzero and so itself is linearly independent. By
Algorithm 1, we partition A1 into the following two disjoint subsets A
′
1 and A
′′
1 :
A
′
1 =
{
{ei} ∈ A1 : ~b
(2)
1 ,
~f
(2)
i are linearly dependent
}
=
{
{e2}, {e3}, {e9}
}
,
A
′′
1 =
{
{ei} ∈ A1 : ~b
(2)
1 ,
~f
(2)
i are linearly independent
}
=
{
{e1}, {e4}
}
.
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First, for each A ∈ A ′1 , note that L
(n−1)
A = L
(2)
A (cf. (11)) is either a 1-dimensional subspace spanned
by
[
1
0
]
(L
(2)
{e2}
and L
(2)
{e3}
) or a null space (L
(2)
{e9}
). Thus, we arbitrarily choose an F5-valued column
2-vector
~h ∈ Fn−1q \
⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
)
= F25 \
〈[
1
0
]〉
, say ~h =

0
1

 .
Next, for all A ∈ A ′′1 , i.e., {e1} and {e4}, we respectively calculate
~h =

0
1

 = αe1~b (2)1 + βe1 ~f (2)1 = 0 ·

1
0

+ 1 ·

0
1

 , i.e., (αe1 , βe1) = (0, 1),
and
~h =

0
1

 = αe4~b (2)1 + βe4 ~f (2)4 = 0 ·

1
0

+ 1 ·

0
1

 , i.e., (αe4 , βe4) = (0, 1).
According to (αe1 , βe1) = (0, 1) and (αe4 , βe4) = (0, 1), we calculate
θ{e1} = αe1b1,3 + βe1fe1,3 = 1 · 1 = 1, and θ{e4} = αe4b1,3 + βe4fe4,3 = 1 · 2 = 2.
Consequently, we choose θ = 3 (since θ · θ{e1} = 3 6= −1 and θ · θ{e4} = 1 6= −1), and let
~ℓ = θ · ~h =

0
3

 .
In fact, the sets K{e1} and K{e4} (see (25)) are
K{e1} =
{[
0
4
]
,
[
4
4
]
,
[
3
4
]
,
[
2
4
]
,
[
1
4
]}
,
K{e4} =
{[
0
2
]
,
[
2
2
]
,
[
4
2
]
,
[
1
2
]
,
[
3
2
]}
,
and thus we see that
~ℓ =

0
3

 ∈ Fn−1q \

 ⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
) ⋃
A∈A ′′
r
KA

 = F25 \ [〈[ 10 ]〉⋃K{e1}⋃K{e4}].
With the vector ~ℓ we have chosen, we compute
K(2)s (
~ℓ) =
[
I2 ~ℓ
]
·Ks =
[
~f
(2)
1 (
~ℓ) ~f
(2)
2 (
~ℓ) ~f
(2)
3 (
~ℓ) ~f
(2)
4 (
~ℓ)
]
=
[
0 1 1 0
4 3 1 2
]
,
Q(2)(~ℓ) =
[
I2 ~ℓ
]
·Q(3) =
[
~b
(2)
1 (
~ℓ) ~b
(2)
2 (
~ℓ) ~b
(2)
3 (
~ℓ)
]
=
[
1 0 0
0 1 3
]
.
We further let Q(2) =
[
~b
(2)
1 (
~ℓ) ~b
(2)
2 (
~ℓ)
]
= I2. Then, we obtain a 2-dimensional SLNC (Q
(2))−1 · C2 with
security level 1 and rate 1, where
C2 =
[
I2 ~ℓ
]
· C3 =
{
K(2)s (
~ℓ) =
[
0 1 1 0
4 3 1 2
]
, K1 = K2 = K4 = [ 1 1 ] , K3 =
[
4
1
]}
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(cf. Theorem 1). Clearly, (Q(2))−1 · C2 has the same local encoding kernels as (Q
(3))−1 · C3 at all the
non-source nodes. In the use of (Q(2))−1 · C2, i) at the source node s, we use Q
(2) to linearly encode the
source message and the key and then use K
(2)
s (~ℓ) to encode the linearly-encoded message at the source
node s; and then ii) at each the intermediate node v1, v2, v3, v4, use the unchanged local encoding kernel
for encoding.
Field Size of Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 requires the field size |Fq| > |Ar|, and thus a base field Fq of order
q > max
{∣∣T ∣∣, ∣∣Ar∣∣}6 (41)
is sufficient for constructing a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs with the fixed security level r
and rates from Cmin − r to 0. In addition, we note that max
{
|T |, |Ar|
}
is also the best known lower
bound on the required field size for the existence of an SLNC with rate ω and security level r (cf. [18]).
Therefore, we see that there is no penalty at all on the field size (in terms of the best known lower bound)
for constructing such a family of local-encoding-preserving SLNCs.
Complexity of Algorithm 1:
For the purpose of determining the time complexity of Algorithm 1, we do not differentiate an addition
from a multiplication over a finite field, although in general the time needed for a multiplication is much
longer than that needed for an addition. We further assume that the time complexity of each operation,
i.e., an addition or a multiplication, is O(1) regardless of the finite field.
Now, we discuss the complexity of Algorithm 1.
• For Line 1, in order to find ω − 1 linearly independent vectors in ~b
(n−1)
1 ,
~b
(n−1)
2 ,· · · ,
~b
(n−1)
ω , it
suffices to transform the (n− 1)×ω matrix
[
~b
(n−1)
1
~b
(n−1)
2 · · ·
~b
(n−1)
ω
]
into one in row echelon
form by a sequence of elementary row operations. By Gaussian elimination, this transformation
takes at most O
(
ω2(n− 1)
)
operations.
• For Line 2, in order to determine the linear relationship between the n − 1 vectors ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤
i ≤ ω − 1,7 ~f
(n−1)
e , e ∈ A, for each edge subset A in Ar, it suffices to compute the rank of the
(n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix
[
~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e , e ∈ A
]
, which takes at most O
(
(n− 1)3
)
operations by Gaussian elimination. By considering all the edge subsets A in Ar, the complexity
for partitioning Ar into A
′
r and A
′′
r (i.e., Line 2) is at most O
(
|Ar|(n− 1)
3
)
.
6The reason for requiring q > |T | here is to guarantee the existence of a Cmin-dimensional linear network code CCmin on G.
7Here, we still assume that ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, are chosen to be linearly independent.
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• For Line 3, we need to find a vector ~h such that
~h ∈ Fn−1q \
⋃
A∈A ′
r
(
B
(n−1)
ω−1 + L
(n−1)
A
)
.
By [40, Lemma 11], such a vector can be found with O
(
(n−1)|A ′r | ·
[
(n−1)2+ |A ′r |
])
operations.
• We now consider the “for” loop (Lines 4–6). For Line 5, note that ~b
(n−1)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1,
~f
(n−1)
e ,
e ∈ A, are n − 1 linearly independent (n − 1)-dimensional vectors for any A ∈ A ′′r , and thus
they together form a basis of the vector space Fn−1q . So, for the vector
~h we have chosen, for each
A ∈ A ′′r , we can find the unique row (n− 1)-vector
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q such
that
~h =
ω−1∑
i=1
αi~b
(n−1)
i +
∑
e∈A
βe ~f
(n−1)
e (42)
with O
(
(n−1)3
)
operations, since finding this row (n−1)-vector is equivalent to solving the system
of linear equations (42), which takes at most O
(
(n−1)3
)
operations by Gaussian elimination. With
the (n − 1)-row vector
(
αi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, βe, e ∈ A
)
∈ Fn−1q , we compute θA =
∑ω−1
i=1 αibi,n +∑
e∈A βefe,n in Line 6, which takes at most O
(
n − 1
)
operations. Thus, the total complexity of
determining θA for all A ∈ A
′′
r is at most O
(
|A ′′r |(n − 1)
3
)
.
• For Line 7, to choose a nonzero element θ in Fq such that θ · θA 6= −1 for all A ∈ A
′′
r , the
complexity is O
(
|A ′′r |
)
.
• For Line 8, the calculation of the vector ~ℓ = θ~h takes at most O
(
n− 1
)
operations.
• Clearly, the complexity of Lines 9 and 10 are at most O
(
(n−1)|Out(s)|
)
(that is O(n−1) because
|Out(s)| is fixed) and O
(
n(n− 1)
)
, respectively.
• The complexity analysis of Line 11 is similar to that of Line 1. To obtain Q(n−1), it suffices to
transform the (n − 1) × n matrix Q(n−1)(~ℓ) into one in row echelon form, which takes at most
O
(
(n − 1)2 · n
)
operations by Gaussian elimination.
Therefore, by combining all the foregoing complexity analyses of Lines 1–11, the total complexity of
Algorithm 1 is at most
O
(
(n − 1)3|Ar|+ (n− 1)|A
′
r |
2
)
. (43)
For the approach we proposed at the beginning of Section III-B, which, by totally redesigning a linear
pre-coding operation at the source node, can also construct a local-encoding-preserving SLNC with the
fixed security level r and rate ω − 1, the complexity is
O
(
(ω − 1)n3
∣∣Ar∣∣+ (ω − 1)(n − 1)∣∣Ar∣∣2 + r(n− 1)3) (44)
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(cf. the 5th footnote or Appendix A). Upon comparing (43) and (44), we see that the complexity of
Algorithm 1 is considerably smaller than one ωth of that of the approach described immediately above.
On the other hand, for Algorithm 1, in order to store the matrix Q(n) at the source node s, it suffices to
store the column (n−1)-vector ~ℓ only. This implies that the storage cost is O
(
n−1
)
, which is considerably
smaller than the storage costO
(
n2
)
of the approach proposed at the beginning of Section III-B (cf. the 5th
footnote). Thus, our approach reduces considerably the complexity and storage cost further.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In a secure network coding system, the requirements for information transmission and information
security may vary over time. We investigate the problem of secure network coding under the above
consideration in this two-part paper. To efficiently solve this problem, we put forward local-encoding-
preserving secure network coding, where a family of SLNCs is called local-encoding-preserving if all the
SLNCs in this family share a common local encoding kernel at each intermediate node in the network. This
approach can avoid all the shortcomings, in terms of computation cost, storage cost, and implementation
overhead, of the straightforward but cumbersome approach that uses the existing code constructions to
obtain an SLNC for each pair of rate and security level.
In this paper (i.e., Part I of the two-part paper), we consider local-encoding-preserving secure network
coding for a fixed security level. We have developed an approach that can construct a family of local-
encoding-preserving SLNCs with a fixed security level and the rate ranging from 1 to the maximum
possible. We also presented a polynomial-time algorithm for efficient implementation. Our approach
not only guarantees the local-encoding-preserving property for the family of SLNCs as constructed, but
also incurs no penalty on the required field size in the construction of such a family of local-encoding-
preserving SLNCs for the existence of SLNCs in terms of the best known lower bound by Guang and
Yeung [18].
In Part II [36], we will continue the studies in this paper by tackling first local-encoding-preserving
secure network coding for a fixed rate, and then local-encoding-preserving secure network coding for a
fixed dimension (equal to the sum of rate and security level). The approaches in the current paper and
the companion paper will be combined to solve the ultimate problem of local-encoding-preserving secure
network coding for the whole rate and security-level region.
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APPENDIX A
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCTING A REQUIRED MATRIX Q(n)
Let ω be the fixed rate and r be the security level. Let n = ω + r ≤ Cmin. For a given n-
dimensional linear network code Cn =
{
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ E
}
over a finite field Fq on the network G,
8
we consider in the following the complexity of constructing an Fq-valued n × n invertible matrix
Q(n) =
[
~b
(n)
1
~b
(n)
2 · · ·
~b
(n)
n
]
using the method in [15] such that (Q(n))−1 · Cn is a rate-ω and
security-level-r SLNC on G, i.e., i) ~b
(n)
1 ,
~b
(n)
2 , · · · ,
~b
(n)
n are linearly independent and ii)
〈
~b
(n)
i : 1 ≤ i ≤ ω
〉⋂〈
~f (n)e : e ∈ A
〉
= {~0}, ∀ A ∈ Ar. (45)
In order to constructing a matrix Q(n), we in turn choose n vectors ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as follows:
~b
(n)
1 ∈ F
n
q \
⋃
A∈Ar
L
(n)
A , (46)
~b
(n)
i ∈ F
n
q \
⋃
A∈Ar
(
B
(n)
i−1 + L
(n)
A
)
, 2 ≤ i ≤ ω, (47)
~b
(n)
i ∈ F
n
q \ B
(n)
i−1, ω + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (48)
where B
(n)
i =
〈
~b
(n)
j : 1 ≤ j ≤ i
〉
and L
(n)
A =
〈
~f
(n)
e : e ∈ A
〉
. Clearly, the chosen ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are
linearly independent and satisfy the security condition (45) for security level r.
By [40, Lemma 11], the vectors ~b
(n)
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ ω satisfying (46) or (47) can be found in time
O
(
ωn3
∣∣Ar∣∣+ ωn∣∣Ar∣∣2),
and the vectors ~b
(n)
i , ω+1 ≤ i ≤ n satisfying (48) can be found in O
(
r(n3+n)
)
operations. Therefore,
the total complexity is
O
(
ωn3
∣∣Ar∣∣+ ωn∣∣Ar∣∣2 + rn3) .
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